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John Marshall Harlan I
Introduction
Justice John Marshall Harlan I was appointed to the United States Supreme Court by
President Rutherford Birchard Hayes on October 29, 1877.ii At the time of his
appointment, Morrison Remick Waite was Chief Justice of the Court. Justice Harlan
served under Chief Justice Waite until 1888. After the death of Chief Justice Waite,
Justice Harlan served under two other Chief Justices: Melville Weston Fuller between
1888 and 1910 and Edward Douglass White, Jr., in 1910 and 1911.iii Justice Harlan is
one of twenty-two associate justices to have served with at least three different Chief
Justices.iv
The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has three primary
responsibilities: managerial leadership, intellectual leadership, and social leadership,v all
of which require sustained interaction with the associate justices serving during their
tenure. Given the influence that necessarily accompanies the position of Chief Justice,
and Justice Harlan’s position of having served with three different Chief Justices, the
current essay explores the intellectual relationship between Justice Harlan and the three
Chief Justices with whom he served. Specifically, an empirical exploration attempts to
determine whether Justice Harlan’s judicial philosophy and decisionmaking were
influenced by the three Chief Justices with whom he served or whether he remained
intellectually independent throughout his thirty-four year career on the Court.
Part I of this essay provides a detailed description of Justice Harlan: his
upbringing; educational background; political and religious affiliations and experiences;
and judicial, social, and political philosophies.
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Part II, first, discusses the extent to which Chief Justice Waite fulfilled the
responsibilities of managerial, intellectual, and social leadership during his tenure as
Chief Justice; second, provides the results from a quantitative analysis of all Supreme
Court decisions during the Waite era; third, presents a qualitative analysis of those cases
in which Justice Harlan and Chief Justice Waite recorded divergent opinions; and fourth,
reviews Justice Harlan’s contributions to Strauder v. West Virginiavi and the Civil Rights
Cases.vii
Part III, first, discusses the extent to which Chief Justice Fuller fulfilled the
responsibilities of managerial, intellectual, and social leadership during his tenure as
Chief Justice; second, provides the results from a quantitative analysis of all Supreme
Court decisions during the Fuller era; third, presents a qualitative analysis of those cases
in which Justice Harlan and Chief Justice Fuller recorded divergent opinions; and fourth,
reviews Justice Harlan’s contributions to Fong Yue Ting v. United Statesviii and Plessy v.
Ferguson.ix
Part IV, first, discusses the extent to which Chief Justice White fulfilled the
responsibilities of managerial, intellectual, and social leadership during his career as
Chief Justice; second, provides the results from a quantitative analysis of all Supreme
Court decisions during the White era; third, presents a qualitative analysis of those cases
in which Justice Harlan and Chief Justice White recorded divergent opinions; and fourth,
reviews Justice Harlan’s contribution to Standard Oil Company v. United States.x
Part V concludes that Justice Harlan’s judicial philosophy remained independent
throughout his term on the Court and that the Chief Justices with whom he served likely
had little influence on his decisionmaking.
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Background of John Marshall Harlan I
John Marshall Harlan I was born on a farm in Boyle County, Kentucky, on

June 1, 1833, the son of James Harlan, an influential lawyer and politician who served as
a United States Attorney and in the United States House of Representatives.xi The family
moved to Harrodsburg, Kentucky, in 1835, and to Frankfort, the capital of Kentucky, in
1840.xii A descendant of Quaker immigrants and a stern Presbyterian,xiii Justice Harlan
was raised in comfortable circumstances in a slaveholding family.xiv
Justice Harlan received his A.B. degree from Centre College in 1850 at the
age of seventeen and subsequently studied law at Transylvania University for two
years.xv In 1853, he was admitted to the bar and began to practice law. In 1854, Harlan
was elected city attorney, and, in 1856, was reelected for a second two-year term.xvi In
that same year, he married Malvina Shanklin of Evansville, Indiana, whose memoirs
detailing her relationship with her husband and their lives in Kentucky were recently
published.xvii The Harlans had six children.xviii A grandson – John Marshall Harlan II –
served on the Supreme Court between 1955 and 1971.xix
In 1858, Justice Harlan, at the age of twenty-five, served for one year as
Franklin County Judge, winning election on the Know Nothing ticket.xx The Know
Nothings, a nativist (anti-immigrant) party, enjoyed brief popularity between the collapse
of the Whig party and the rise of the Republican party.xxi The nativist movement,
championing the so-called rights of Protestant, American-born male voters, grew out of
fear over new waves of immigration.
Between 1820 and 1845, a modest influx of immigrants arrived in the United
States. Immigration surged between 1845 and 1854, however, with three million aliens
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pouring into seaboard cities like Boston and New York. With this influx of immigrants,
membership in the Know Nothing party soared.xxii By 1854, the Know-Nothings had
formed the American Party and won elections nationwide. Once they began to try to
enact legislation, however, the Know-Nothings became mired in political reality.xxiii
Although they had transcended their own xenophobic expressions and tried to achieve
desirable reform, their accomplishments were transitory.
Justice Harlan ran for the United States House of Representatives in 1859, but
was narrowly defeated.xxiv In 1861, he moved to Louisville to practice law. He believed
that a civil war was likely and that, if war came, the border states would leave the
Union.xxv On April 12, 1861, the Civil War began when the Confederate army attacked
Fort Sumter.xxvi During the Civil War, Justice Harlan joined the Union Army and served
as a Colonel. He resigned his commission in 1863 to help his family at home, narrowly
missing promotion to Brigadier General, which was before the United States Senate at the
time of his resignation.xxvii
After his return home, Justice Harlan was elected Attorney General of
Kentucky and served as a member of the Constitutional Union Party between 1863 and
1867.xxviii In the Presidential election of 1864, he bitterly criticized Abraham Lincoln and
voiced his displeasure with the Thirteenth Amendment. He firmly believed that the
abolition of slavery by the Federal government was “a flagrant invasion of the right of
self-government.”xxix Indeed, Justice Harlan himself owned slaves until he was forced to
free them by the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.
In the Presidential campaign of 1868, Justice Harlan switched camps,
embracing the Republican Party and Ulysses S. Grant for President. He now defended
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the Civil War Amendments because he believed they were necessary for the
reconstruction of the Union.xxx Justice Harlan ran for Governor of Kentucky in 1875 on
the Republican ticket, but lost to J.B. McCreary.xxxi Following President Rutherford B.
Hayes’ presidential victory, a campaign on which he assisted, the President considered
Justice Harlan for Attorney General, but was advised against it for political reasons.xxxii
Justice Harlan subsequently refused a diplomatic post and ultimately accepted an
appointment to the Louisiana Commission.xxxiii
A muscular, athletic,xxxiv and imposing figure at 6’ 2” and 240 pounds with a
deep and powerful voice,xxxv Justice Harlan was nominated to the Supreme Court by
President Hayes on October 17, 1877, to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of
Justice David Davis, who left the Court to run for the United States Senate.xxxvi The
Senate confirmed Justice Harlan’s appointment on November 29, 1877,xxxvii and he began
his service, at forty-four years old, on December 10, 1877.xxxviii
Justice Harlan had a reputation on the bench for individualism, frankness,
honesty and integrity.xxxix His deep religious convictions shaped, in great part, his
understanding of the Supreme Court and the role of judicial decisionmaking.xl He
viewed the Court as guardian of the Constitution, but fervently eschewed Justice Stephen
Field’s “natural rights” philosophy.xli Justice Harlan was “a stern defender of the Bill of
Rights and the due process clause, and despite his border state origin became a vigorous
and eloquent advocate of a nationalistic interpretation of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments.”xlii A fervent federalist, a strict national constitutionalist,xliii and
the author of more than 1,100 opinions (approximately 700 majority, 100 concurring, and
300 dissenting),xliv Justice Harlan, known as “The Great Dissenter,” died on October 14,
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1911, at the age of seventy-eight. He served on the Supreme Court for thirty-four years,
a tenure exceeded by only four other Justices.xlv

II.

Justice Harlan and the Waite Court
a. Background
Chief Justice Waite was nominated to the Supreme Court on January 19,

1874, and confirmed on January 21, 1874.xlvi The process by which Chief Justice Waite
was nominated – as the relatively obscure, seventh choice of President Ulysses S.
Grantxlvii – is viewed by some as a harbinger to the mediocrity that characterized his
era.xlviii Moreover, he was nominated to a position that several sitting associates justices,
including John F. Swayne, William Strong, and Samuel F. Miller, had coveted, which
further hindered his appeal.xlix These stumbling blocks aside, Chief Justice Waite is now
viewed as an exceptional social and managerial leader and an adequate intellectual one.l
While he was able to “fashion camaraderie necessary for the Court to function
effectively”li and “maintain Court unity,lii he “relinquished much of the intellectual
leadership of the Court to his colleagues.liii The subsections that follow, first, provide a
quantitative analysis of those cases in which both Chief Justice Waite and Justice Harlan
participated; second, provide a qualitative analysis of those cases in which Chief Justice
Waite and Justice Harlan recorded divergent opinions; and third, provide an in-depth
examination of Strauderliv and the Civil Rights Cases.lv
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b. Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis of Supreme Court decisions during the Waite, Fuller,
and White Courts involved several steps. First, the analysis was restricted to only those
decisions in which Justice Harlan and the aforementioned Chief Justices participated
contemporaneously. All decisions in which either Justice Harlan or the Chief Justice
failed to participate were excluded. Second, for each decision rendered, the following
information from the United States Reports was extracted: the year the case was decided,
whether the case was decided unanimously, whether the Chief Justice voted in the
majority, whether the Chief Justice authored the majority opinion, whether the Chief
Justice submitted a concurring or dissenting opinion, whether Justice Harlan voted in the
majority, whether Justice Harlan authored the majority opinion, and whether Justice
Harlan submitted a concurring or dissenting opinion. With the exception of the year the
case was decided, all of the variables were coded dichotomously (No/Yes) and entered
into an SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) database. Third, univariate and
bivariate analyses were conducted with all of the available data.
A total of 2,672 Supreme Court cases were decided during the time that Chief
Justice Waite and Justice Harlan served simultaneously. Of these decisions, 2,449 (92
percent) were decided unanimously. This consistent agreement, which spanned more
than a decade, suggests that Chief Justice Waite probably wielded very little intellectual
influence over the associate justices. Rather, the high majority of unanimous decisions
suggests either that the cases coming before the Court were straightforward or that all of
the Justices enjoyed comparable intellectual acumen.
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Of these 2,672 cases, Justice Harlan voted with the majority 97 percent of the
time (n=2,598), while Chief Justice Waite sided with the majority 98 percent of the time
(n=2,624). Justice Harlan authored the majority opinion eight percent of the time
(n=222), while Chief Justice Waite wrote the majority opinion in 713 cases (27 percent).
During this time frame, Justice Harlan authored six concurring (less than one percent)
and 74 (three percent) dissenting opinions, while Chief Justice Waite wrote two (less than
one percent) concurring and 48 (two percent) dissenting opinions.
Justice Harlan and Chief Justice Waite cast similar votes in 2,570 cases (96
percent), opposing each other in 102 cases (four percent). When Chief Justice Waite
sided with the majority, Justice Harlan authored a dissenting opinion in 64 cases. When
Justice Harlan sided with the majority, Chief Justice Waite authored 38 dissenting
opinions. A qualitative exploration of these 102 cases follows below.

c. Qualitative Analysis
The qualitative analysis of the 102 cases in which Justice Harlan and Chief
Justice Waite voiced divergent opinions yielded no evidence in support of the hypothesis
that the Chief Justice influenced Justice Harlan’s decisionmaking, for four reasons. First,
many dissenting opinions were recognized with no explanation for why they were
submitted. That is, at the end of the majority opinion, only the phrase “Justice Harlan
dissents” was presented with no additional textual explanation.
Second, those dissenting opinions that were accompanied by textual support
were sometimes authored by a different justice. It is impossible to know, therefore, the
extent to which either Chief Justice Waite or Justice Harlan contributed to that opinion.
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Third, those dissenting opinions that were authored by Chief Justice Waite or
Justice Harlan were sometimes co-authored, again making it impossible to distinguish
between intellectual contributions.
Finally, there were no overt or subtle textual references, by either Chief
Justice Waite or Justice Harlan, which suggested an influence by the former over the
latter. In short, if Chief Justice Waite did influence Justice Harlan’s judicial
decisionmaking, there was no evidence of it in the qualitative analysis.
Despite the lack of direct qualitative evidence, however, there was evidence to
suggest that Justice Harlan remained consistent in his judicial thought throughout his
tenure on the Waite Court. This temporal intellectual consistency suggests that, rather
than being influenced by Chief Justice Waite, Justice Harlan remained true to his own
ideals and consistently voted his own conscience.

d. Case Studies
i. Strauder v. West Virginia
In Strauder, a black man was convicted of murder in a West Virginia state
court by a jury on which blacks had been excluded by statute.lvi The Supreme Court of
West Virginia affirmed the conviction. The United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 vote
decision in which both Justices Harlan and Waite voted with the majority (Justices
Stephen J. Field and Nathan Clifford dissented), reversed the conviction, holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment conferred upon every citizen the right to a trial by a “jury
selected and impaneled without discrimination against his race or color.lvii The issue,
therefore, was not whether blacks had the right to a jury of other blacks, but whether
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black citizens were eligible for empanelling in the jury pool. Because the intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to remove race from the equation in civil matters, the Court
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to assure that blacks be allowed
to enjoy all of the civil rights enjoyed by whites.

ii. Civil Rights Cases
The Civil Rights Act, passed on March 1, 1875, provided that, “all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public
conveyances on land and water, theatres, and other places of amusement . . . applicable
alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of
servitude.”lviii In the Civil Rights Cases, six cases were consolidated from five states in
which blacks had sued theaters, hotels, and transit companies that had excluded them
from “white only” facilities.lix The primary issue in the Civil Rights Cases was whether
Congress had the right to enact a law requiring equal access to public accommodations
under its Fourteenth Amendment powers.
In an 8-1 vote, in which only Justice Harlan dissented, the Court held that the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibited denial of equal protection by
state governments, did not give Congress power to regulate private acts.lx That is,
Congress lacked the constitutional authority under the enforcement provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals and
organizations. Holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional, the Civil
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Rights Cases espoused the position that Congressional legislation can only be corrective,
and that no laws could infringe on the States’ ability to govern themselves.lxi
In his dissent, Justice Harlan challenged the Court’s narrow interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.lxii He maintained that Congress, through the 1875 Civil Rights
Act, was attempting to overcome the refusal of the states to protect those rights denied to
blacks that white citizens took as their birthright. As Justice Harlan noted, “the one
underlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to enable the black race to take
the rank of mere citizens. The difficulty has been to compel a recognition of their legal
right to take that rank, and to secure the enjoyment of privileges belonging, under the
law, to them as a component part of the people for whose welfare and happiness
government is ordained.”lxiii In his dissent, Justice Harlan correctly predicted the
consequences of the decision in the Civil Rights Cases. The ruling ushered in widespread
segregation in housing, employment, and public life that confined blacks to second-class
citizenship until the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s.

III.

Justice Harlan and the Fuller Court
a. Background
Chief Justice Fuller was nominated to the Supreme Court by President Grover

Cleveland on April 30, 1988, to replace Chief Justice Waite.lxiv He was confirmed by the
Senate on July 20, 1888.lxv Justice Harlan’s presence on the Fuller Court spanned more
than two decades. Of the three Chief Justices under whom he served, his tenure on the
Fuller Court was the longest. Justice Harlan was also the only associate justice to have
served for the duration of the Fuller Court.lxvi
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Chief Justice Fuller is generally recognized as one of the most prolific writers
and one of the best administrators the Supreme Court has ever had.lxvii He was also
known for perpetuating good working relationships with the associate justices and
excelled at the social leadership role in the Court.lxviii What he enjoyed in social
leadership, however, he may have lacked in intellectual brilliance and almost always
voted with the majority.lxix
When Fuller became Chief Justice, the United States was experiencing
significant economic change, particularly the growth of industry and corporate
enterprise.lxx As a result of the economic importance of the times, the Fuller Court was
characterized by its “dedication to economic liberty as the preeminent constitutional
value.”lxxi In addition to the economic issues of the era, the Fuller Court also addressed
significant issues related to civil rights and immigration. There was still a push to
establish “white rule” in the South,lxxii and there was growing apprehension about the
flood of immigrants in the late nineteenth century. The subsections that follow, first,
provide a quantitative analysis of those cases in which both Chief Justice Fuller and
Justice Harlan participated; second, provide a qualitative analysis of those cases in which
Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan recorded divergent opinions; and third, examine
immigration and civil rights issues in Fong Yue Tinglxxiii and Plessy.lxxiv

b. Quantitative Analysis
A total of 4,724 Supreme Court cases were decided during the period in which
Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan served contemporaneously. Of these decisions,
3,961 (84 percent) were decided unanimously. While the degree of unanimity during the
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Fuller era was significantly lower than in the Waite era (92 percent v. 84 percent,
p<0.001), the statistical significance represents little practical significance and is most
likely due to the large number of cases under scrutiny. The consistent agreement during
this era, which spanned more than two decades, suggests that Chief Justice Fuller
probably wielded very little intellectual influence over the associate justices. Like in the
Waite era, the high proportion of unanimous decisions suggests either that the cases
coming before the Court were uncomplicated or that all of the Justices enjoyed
comparable decisionmaking skills.
Of these 4,724 cases, Justice Harlan voted with the majority 94 percent of the
time (n=4,439), while Chief Justice Fuller sided with the majority 97 percent of the time
(n=4,589). Justice Harlan authored the majority opinion nine percent of the time
(n=444), while Chief Justice Fuller wrote the majority opinion in 758 cases (16 percent).
During this time frame, Justice Harlan authored 41 concurring (less than one percent) and
285 (six percent) dissenting opinions, while Chief Justice Fuller wrote seven (less than
one percent) concurring and 135 (three percent) dissenting opinions.
Justice Harlan and Chief Justice Fuller cast similar votes in 4,392 cases (93
percent), opposing each other in 332 cases (seven percent). When Chief Justice Waite
sided with the majority, Justice Harlan authored a dissenting opinion in 241 cases. When
Justice Harlan sided with the majority, Chief Justice Fuller authored 91 dissenting
opinions. A qualitative exploration of these 332 cases follows below.
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c. Qualitative Analysis
Like with Chief Justice Waite, the qualitative analysis of those cases in which
Justice Harlan and Chief Justice Fuller voiced divergent opinions yielded no evidence in
support of the hypothesis that the Chief Justice influenced Justice Harlan’s
decisionmaking. Justice Harlan did, however, remain consistent in his judicial thought
throughout his tenure on the Fuller Court. Like during the Waite era, this intellectual
consistency suggests that Justice Harlan’s contributions to the Court were made
independent of any external influence by Chief Justice Fuller.

d. Case Studies
i. Fong Yue Ting v. United States
In Fong Yue Ting, a Chinese laborer who had been working legally in the United
States applied to the Internal Revenue Service for a certificate of residence. Denied
because his witnesses were Chinese, he was subsequently arrested for violating the Act of
1892, part of which reiterated the bar on new Chinese laborers into the United States.lxxv
In addition, the Act called for deportation. The plaintiff’s deportation was then ordered
after he could not prove, with a white witness, that he had been living in the United States
legally.lxxvi
The Supreme Court was faced with deciding whether the deportation provision of
the Act was constitutional because it granted Congress the right to expel persons who do
not comply with the requirements to become citizens. The Court, in a 6-3 decision in
which Justice Harlan sided with the majority and Justice Fuller authored a dissenting
opinion, ruled that Congress did have the right to deport the plaintiff.lxxvii Relying on the

John Marshall Harlan I

16

foreign affairs power, the majority acknowledged that there was little place for the
judiciary in the immigration process. Fong Yue Ting explicitly held that the power to
deport aliens rests upon the same ground as the exclusion power and is equally “absolute
and unqualified.”lxxviii
In his dissent, Justice Fuller stated that the judiciary did have the power to review
Congressional legislation that affected Chinese laborers who are lawfully within the
United States.lxxix Challenging the notion that aliens are entitled to avail themselves of
the Constitution for all matters except those related to their expulsion, Chief Justice
Fuller argued that deportation without a trial amounted to criminal punishment, and was
thus a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Specifically, he maintained that “a legislative sentence of banishment . . .
contains within it the germs of the assertion of an unlimited and arbitrary power . . .
incompatible with the immutable principles of justice, inconsistent with the nature of our
government, and in conflict with the written constitution by which that government was
created, and those principles secured.”lxxx Fong Yue Ting thus represents a
jurisprudential difference between Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan, with the
former advocating judicial review in all constitutional matters and the latter, consistent
with Know-Nothing rhetoric, voting against the expansion of immigrant rights.

ii. Plessy v. Ferguson
Immediately after the end of the Civil War, the Federal government provided
some protection for the civil rights of the newly freed slaves. When Reconstruction
ended in 1877 and Federal troops were withdrawn, however, Southern state governments
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began passing “Jim Crow” laws that prohibited blacks from using the same public
accommodations as whites. Louisiana had passed a law requiring “equal but separate”
accommodations for whites and blacks on railroads, including separate railway cars .lxxxi
On June 7, 1892, Homer Plessy, who was seven-eighths white, purchased a first-class
ticket on the East Louisiana Railway. After Plessy had taken a seat in the whites-only
railway car, he was asked to sit in the blacks-only car. He refused and was arrested and
subsequently convicted and fined.
In a 7-1 decision, with Justice Brewer not participating and Justice Harlan
dissenting, the Court upheld the Louisiana statute. The Court examined whether the
“separate but equal” doctrine was a violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.lxxxii Because the Louisiana statute had nothing to do with slavery, the
majority reasoned, the Thirteenth Amendment was not implicated.lxxxiii Moreover, the
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated because the creation of
“separate” parts within society did not necessarily mean that one race was deemed
inferior to the another.lxxxiv
The majority in Plessy believed that the Louisiana statute was a reasonable
regulation and that State legislatures should be given wide discretion in how they
addressed race relations. Writing for the majority in which Chief Justice Fuller assented,
Justice Henry B. Brown noted that segregation and discrimination were two entirely
different things – the law, therefore, was neutral.lxxxv The Court thus rejected the view
that the Louisiana law fostered inferiority of blacks, but held rather that the law merely
separated the races as a matter of social policy.lxxxvi The majority also drew a distinction
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between social and civil/political rights, effectively guaranteeing blacks political rights,
but denying them social equality.lxxxvii
In his famous dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited the regulation of the use of a public highway solely on the basic of race. He
advocated for “color-blindness” when interpreting the law.lxxxviii That is, if the law was
not color blind, it was necessarily a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Louisiana statute, which specifically articulated a distinction based on race, was colorfocused. Harlan declared, “. . . but in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. Our constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil
rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The law regards man as man, and takes no
account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved.”lxxxix The case helped cement the legal foundation
for the doctrine of “separate but equal,” which permitted separation of the races, but only
as long as facilities for both races were of equal quality. Practically, however, Southern
state governments refused to provide blacks with genuinely equal facilities and resources
in the years after the Plessy decision.
The decision in Plessy, like Fong Yue Ting, also represents a significant
jurisprudential difference between Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan. Justice
Harlan’s positions in these two cases, however, are curious and potentially incongruous.
While the majority opinion in Fong Yue Ting is consistent with his past anti-immigrant
political affiliations, his dissent in Plessy represents a confrontation with personal and
United States history and a subsequent overcoming of discriminatory ideals. While
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Justice Harlan owned slaves prior to their emancipation, he was nevertheless able to
reconcile this inequity and ultimately come to the conclusion that color-based distinctions
under the law are ethically unsound and constitutionally prohibited.

IV.

Justice Harlan and the White Court
a. Background
Chief Justice Fuller died on July 4, 1910, having served as Chief Justice for

twenty-two years.xc President William Howard Taft nominated Justice Edward D. White
to succeed Fuller as Chief Justice, the first time that a sitting Justice had been elevated to
the position of Chief. White was appointed to the Court, as an associate justice, on
January 15, 1894, and was confirmed as Chief Justice on December 12, 1910.xci He
assumed the role of Chief Justice on January 3, 1911.xcii
Chief Justice White is recognized as an efficient administrator and social leader,
though these characteristics were considerably more evident during the early part of his
time as Chief.xciii The first several years of the White Court addressed issues similar to
those in the Fuller Court: labor, antitrust litigation, and social and civil rights reform.
Shortly thereafter, however, the White Court was forced to address problems related to
the First World War and the United States’ foray into the international arena. While the
White Court experienced many new and different issues relative to the Waite and Fuller
Courts, Justice Harlan served on the White Court for less than one year before his death.
The subsections that follow, first, provide a quantitative analysis of those cases in which
both Chief Justice White and Justice Harlan participated; second, provide a qualitative
analysis of those cases in which Chief Justice White and Justice Harlan recorded
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divergent opinions; and third, assess Justice Harlan’s contributions to Standard Oil
Company.xciv

b. Quantitative Analysis
A total of 130 Supreme Court cases were decided during the time in which
Chief Justice White and Justice Harlan served contemporaneously. Of these decisions,
114 (88 percent) were decided unanimously. As with the Waite and Fuller eras, this
unanimity suggests that Chief Justice White probably wielded very little intellectual
influence over the associate justices. Rather, the high majority of unanimous votes
suggests either that the cases coming before the Court were straightforward or that all of
the Justices on the Court enjoyed comparable intellectual acumen.
Of the 130 cases, Justice Harlan voted with the majority in 119 cases (92
percent), while Chief Justice White sided with the majority in all 130 cases. Justice
Harlan authored the majority opinion 11 percent of the time (n=14), while Chief Justice
White wrote the majority opinion in 20 cases (15 percent). During this time frame,
Justice Harlan authored no concurring and 11 (nine percent) dissenting opinions, while
Chief Justice White wrote one (less than one percent) concurring opinion.
Justice Harlan and Chief Justice White voted similarly in 119 cases (92
percent), opposing each other in 11 cases (8 percent). All 11 cases involved Chief Justice
White siding with the majority and Justice Harlan dissenting. A qualitative exploration
of these 11 cases follows below.
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c. Qualitative Analysis
Given the short time in which Chief Justice White and Justice Harlan served
on the Court together, there was limited opportunity for meaningful qualitative analyses.
That said, the available data suggest that, like with Chief Justices Waite and Fuller, Chief
Justice White did not influence Justice Harlan’s decisionmaking. Like during the Waite
and Fuller eras, however, Justice Harlan did voice consistent opinions throughout his
short tenure on the White Court, suggesting that his contributions were made independent
of any potential influences by the Chief Justice.

d. Case Study
i. Standard Oil Company v. United States
Standard Oil was a large oil producing, transporting, and refining organization
founded in 1863 by John D. Rockefeller. In January 1870, Rockefeller created one large
company – the Standard Oil Company – and aggressively competed for refinery business,
buying out rival companies.xcv By 1878, Standard Oil held about 90 percent of the
refining capacity in the United States.xcvi
In 1882, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act which, based on Congress’s
constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, declared illegal every contract,
combination (in the form of trust or otherwise), or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and
foreign trade.xcvii Standard Oil’s quasi-monopolistic position had developed from
aggressively competitive business practices, including purchasing competitors and
engaging in volume-discount transportation deals with the railroad companies to ensure it
could undercut smaller competitors’ prices. It did this by ensuring it owned and
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controlled all aspects of the trade. As the public became more aware of the Standard Oil
monopoly, there was more support calling for its dissolution.
In Standard Oil Company, a unanimous Court declared the trust to be an
“unreasonable” monopoly under the Sherman Antitrust Act.xcviii Chief Justice White
stated that Standard Oil was illegal, “because the unification of power and control over
petroleum and its products which was the inevitable result of . . . aggregating so vast a
capital, gives rise . . . to the . . . dominancy over the oil industry . . . and its products in
the channels of interstate commerce.”xcix Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented
in part. While agreeing with the majority that Standard Oil had violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act, Justice Harlan objected to the modifications made by Court to the holding
of the Circuit Court.c He traced the original purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act as,
“the slavery that would result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few
individuals and corporations controlling, for their own profit and advantage exclusively,
the entire business of the country.”ci He then criticized the majority for creating an
exception that had not been envisioned by Congress – that “reasonable” or “undue”
restraints of interstate commerce may not necessarily conflict with the Sherman Antitrust
Act.cii Rather, he maintained, Congress created the simple rule that “there should be no
restraint of trade, in any form.”ciii

Conclusion
Taken collectively, there is little evidence to suggest that the three Chief Justices with
whom Justice Harlan served had a significant impact on his decisionmaking. First, his
reputation both before appointment and during his time on the Court has generally been
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characterized by individualism.civ While it is difficult to know the extent to which he
valued the intellectual capacity of the Chief Justices with whom he served, his reputation
is one of a man dedicated to making his own decisions.
Second, the high majority of Supreme Court cases that were decided unanimously
(greater than 85 percent in each of the three eras) offers little support for the hypothesis
that a single justice ruled the Court. It would be unreasonable to believe that all three
Chief Justices were intellectually persuasive with every justice in almost every case.
Rather, the high prevalence of temporal unanimity suggests that the issues were relatively
straightforward and, as a result, the justices almost always agreed on the outcome.
Third, findings from the quantitative analysis indicate that Justice Harlan authored
dissenting opinions at a consistent rate across the three eras. He dissented in two percent
of the Waite era cases (n=2,672), in six percent of the Fuller era cases (n=4,724), and in
nine percent of the White era cases (n=130). Though these differences are statistically
significant (p<0.001), this significance is most likely due to the large samples or,
alternatively, to Justice Harlan’s greater rejection of conformity as he aged. The
uniformity suggests that, in none of the three eras, did the Chief Justice likely influence
Justice Harlan to the point where the prevalence of his dissenting opinions declined to
any practically significant degree.
Fourth, both the qualitative analyses and the individual case studies suggest that
Justice Harlan’s rationales for decisionmaking were consistent over time. This temporal
consistency suggests that, despite serving in three eras characterized by complex and
divergent issues, his judicial philosophy was not swayed by the three different Chief
Justices with whom he served.

John Marshall Harlan I

24

Several methodological limitations to the current analysis should be noted. First,
while there is little if any quantitative or qualitative evidence to suggest that Justice
Harlan was intellectually influenced by the Chief Justices with whom he served, this lack
of evidence does not necessarily preclude the existence of such a relationship. It is
possible that an accurate answer to the research question may be too difficult given
available sources. While it is more reasonable to believe that the intellectual relationship
between associate justices and their Chief Justice is reciprocal, it is equally plausible that
the Chief Justice wields some cerebral influence over the associate justices. It is the
degree of influence, however, that is difficult to measure.
Second, like with all qualitative research methods, interpretations will vary by the
researcher undertaking the investigation. Different researchers may interpret the
Supreme Court decisions in these three eras differently, which may lead to both divergent
results and alternative conclusions.
Third, the external validity of the findings is an empirical question that can only
be answered with future research. Assuming arguendo that the results of the current
study represent an accurate assessment of the intellectual relationship between Justice
Harlan and the three Chief Justices with whom he served, these results are not necessarily
generalizable to other associate justices who served under multiple Chief Justices. As
mentioned previously, there have been twenty-two associate justices to have served under
at least three Chief Justices.cv As assumption that the results from the current study
would mirror those of other associate justices would be an unsubstantiated one.
During the dinner to commemorate Justice Harlan’s twenty-fifth anniversary on
the Supreme Court, President Theodore Roosevelt noted that he had “exercised over the
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judicial statesmanship of the country of a kind such as is possible only under our own
form of Government.”cvi Having served nearly thirty-four years on the Supreme Court,
Justice John Marshall Harlan I had ample opportunity to express his opinions on a host of
legal questions. Perhaps his most lasting legacy will be his decisions in the area of civil
rights. During the post-Civil War era, there was widespread discrimination against
blacks in American society. Despite the newly passed guarantees espoused in the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, blacks were not accorded the equality
of the laws to which they were entitled. Both the Civil Rights Casescvii and Plessycviii
were landmark opinions in the field of race relations, each stamping blacks as secondclass citizens.cix Within the past fifty years, however, his dissenting positions have been
vindicated.cx While known as “The Great Dissenter,” he is, unquestionably, part of the
Court’s majority on issues related to race relations today.
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